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Abstract 
In a static setting, willingness to pay for an environmental improvement is equal to 
compensating variation. However, in a dynamic setting characterized by uncertainty, 
irreversibility, and the potential for learning, willingness to pay may also contain an 
option value. In this paper, we incorporate the dynamic nature of the value formulation 
process into a study using a contingent valuation method, designed to measure the value 
local residents assign to a north-central Iowa lake. Our results show that willingness to 
pay is highly sensitive to the potential for future learning. Respondents offered the 
opportunity to delay their purchasing decisions until more information became available 
were willing to pay significantly less for improved water quality than those who faced a 
now-or-never decision. The results suggest that welfare analysts should take care to 
accurately represent the potential for future learning.  
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THE DYNAMIC FORMATION OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY:  
AN EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND TEST 
The maximum amount a consumer is willing to pay for a good is a core economic 
concept that is regularly estimated in empirical demand studies, experimental laboratory 
settings, and stated preference surveys. The theoretical basis from which the properties of 
willingness to pay (WTP) are understood comes from the equivalence of this measure 
with compensating (or equivalent) variation.1 Hicksian welfare theory further provides a 
formal basis for how these measures vary with prices and the base utility level. 
The equivalence between the variation concepts and WTP comes from the elegant, 
but static, neoclassical model. In contrast, the real world is a dynamic environment where 
consumers may have the ability to delay purchase decisions until more information is 
gathered about a good, its substitutes, market conditions, and other relevant factors. 
Although static Hicksian theory has little to say about how the potential arrival of new 
information and/or the ability to delay a purchase decision might affect the WTP value, 
recent work by Zhao and Kling (2001, 2002) systematically investigates learning oppor-
tunities in the formation of WTP.  
In an explicitly dynamic setting characterized by uncertainty, irreversibility, and the 
potential for future learning, WTP for a good diverges from the standard variation 
measures. Given that an agent is uncertain about the actual value of the good she is 
interested in buying, delaying the transaction may be in her best interest if more informa-
tion regarding the good’s value can be gained by waiting. Therefore, in order for the 
agent to commit to purchase now and to forgo future learning opportunities, she must be 
compensated by being offered a lower price than would have been acceptable were future 
learning not an option. Zhao and Kling refer to the required compensation as the com-
mitment cost, a concept that is parallel to the quasi-option value in Arrow and Fisher 
1974, Viscusi 1988, and Hanemann 1989. Empirical support for the importance of 
information in the formation of WTP values is provided by the numerous experiments 
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and stated preference surveys that have found that WTP values can vary significantly 
with the amount of information provided about the good. Examples include Samples, 
Dixon, and Gowen 1986; Bergstrom, Stoll, and Randall 1990; Whitehead and Blomquist 
1997; Blomquist and Whitehead 1998; Cummings and Taylor 1999; and List 2001.2  
A key prediction from this theory is that commitment cost increases, as it is easier 
for an agent to delay making a decision and therefore collect relevant information before 
committing to a purchase decision. That is, the WTP for a good today will decline when 
there are additional opportunities to purchase the good or a near substitute in the future. 
In this case, today’s WTP is not comprised simply of the expected surplus from consum-
ing the good. Rather, WTP includes commitment cost and is a dynamic measure that may 
change daily as consumers update their information about the surplus the good might 
yield them. WTP also depends on the fundamental properties of the market environment, 
such as the ability to reverse or delay the purchase. 
If the dynamic elements are of sufficient empirical magnitude, the theory may pro-
vide critical insight into several important and thorny issues related to welfare 
measurement. These include the striking divergences found between WTP and willing-
ness to accept (for an excellent assessment and summary, see Horowitz and McConnell 
2000); the appropriate type and amount of information to provide in valuation exercises; 
and, even more fundamentally, the appropriate definition of the welfare measures for 
benefit-cost assessment under uncertainty. While careful empirical research concerning 
key estimation choices in environmental valuation have been undertaken (see, for exam-
ple, Carson et al. 1997, 1998), the empirical consideration of the dynamic formation of 
WTP values has not been studied. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop and implement a test of whether WTP values 
are formed dynamically as the theory predicts and whether the magnitude of the dynamic 
component, the commitment cost, is sufficiently large to merit further understanding and 
research. We develop an empirical specification of dynamic WTP derived directly from 
the theory and use this specification to test whether the opportunity to delay the decision 
to “purchase” improved environmental quality affects WTP and, in particular, whether 
the effects are consistent with the predictions of the commitment cost model. Data for 
this analysis were collected in the fall of 2000 using a survey designed to estimate the 
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value area residents place on improved water quality in Clear Lake, a spring-fed, glacial 
lake located in north-central Iowa. In order to gauge the impact of potential learning on 
WTP, some respondents were told that the hypothetical referendum contained in the 
survey instrument represented their final chance to vote on improving water quality. 
Others were told that, should the referendum fail, they would be given a second chance to 
vote on the same initiative once further research had been conducted into improving 
water quality. The survey’s results indicate that offering respondents the ability to delay 
their decision significantly reduces WTP, confirming the predictions of the theory. 
 
 
Dynamic Formation of Willingness to Pay  
Consider an individual making decisions to purchase a higher level of environmental 
quality within two periods. Her utility function is time separable: 
 1 1 2 2( , ) ( , )u m g u m gβ+ , (1) 
where tm  represents period t income, tg  represents period t  environmental quality, and 
β is the discount factor. The status quo level of environmental quality is denoted G0. A 
higher level of environmental quality, G, can be purchased in the current period, in the 
second period, or not at all. The purchase decision is irreversible. If G is purchased in the 
current period, it can also be enjoyed in the future at no additional cost. For example, G 
might be achieved by dredging a lake, cleaning up a toxic waste site, or building a park 
facility. For simplicity, we assume away income smoothing: if G  is purchased in period 
t  at price p , tm  will be reduced by p  and income in the other period is not affected. 
The agent is uncertain about the value of G resulting from the improvement or pol-
icy. This may be attributable to her uncertainty regarding the degree to which water 
quality would be improved if the proposed policies were implemented.3 Her beliefs 
regarding G are represented by the distribution function )(0 GF  and the corresponding 
density )(0 Gf  on [ , ]G G , with 0G G≥ . However, she can learn more about G  in the 
second period: for example, on-going research may, by the next period, provide more 
accurate information regarding the degree of water quality improvement brought about 
by proposed mitigation efforts. We represent the new information with a signal 
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⊂∈ Ss  where S is the set of all possible signals. Conditional on the true value of G, 
the distribution of the signals is described by the conditional density function )(| sh Gs . The 
unconditional density function for s is | 0( ) ( ) ( )s Gh s h s dF G= ∫ . Observing s, the agent 
updates her beliefs about G according to Bayes’s rule: | | 0( ) ( ) ( ) / ( )G s s Gf h s f h s⋅ = ⋅ . 
Let 1EU  denote the agent’s expected utility if she purchases G in the current period. 
Because the new level of environmental quality can be enjoyed now and in the future, we 
know 
 ( ) ( )( )1 1 2( ) , ,GEU p E u m p G u m Gβ= − + , (2) 
where p is the price of implementing the new environmental policy and ( )GE ⋅  represents 
expectation over G. Let ),( spV  be the agent’s expected gain from making the purchase 
after observing s :  
 ( )2 2 0 |( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )G sV p s u m p G u m G dF G= − −∫ . (3) 
She will buy G  if and only if 0),( ≥spV . Let { }0),(|)(1 ≥∈= spVSspSP  be the set of 
signals that will induce the agent to purchase G, and SP2(p) be the complement of SP1(p), or 
the set of signals that will lead the agent to opt for the status quo level of environmental 
quality G0. Then the agent’s expected utility if she delays the purchasing decision is  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 0( ) , Pr( ) , | Pr( ) ,P G P PEU p u m G S E u m p G s S S u m Gβ β= + − ∈ + . (4) 
To obtain closed-form solutions, we assume 
 ( , ) (1 ) ,    1, 2.t tt t
m g
u m g t
ρρ
α α
ρ ρ
= + − =  (5) 
This is a monotonic transformation of the familiar constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) utility function, where ]1,0[∈α  is the weight the agent puts on income, and 1≤ρ  
relates to the agent’s elasticity of substitution (the elasticity is )1(1 ρσ −= ). We also 
assume that 1 2m m m= = .  
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Taking into account uncertainty, irreversibility, and the opportunity for learning, the 
agent’s decision in the current period is whether to buy now or to delay the decision until 
the next period when more information will become available. In this dynamic frame-
work, the rational agent’s maximum WTP today, Lwtp , is the critical price Lp  that leaves 
her indifferent between committing to G in the current period and delaying her decision 
until period two.  
Equating 1( )LEU p  and 2 ( )LEU p  and solving for Lp , we get 
 ( )
1
1
,
1 Pr( )
L L
P
A
wtp p m m
S
ρ
ρ
β
 
≡ = − −  
−   (6) 
where  
 ( ) ( )0 1 1 01 1(1 ) ( ) Pr( ) ( | ) .G P G PA E G G S E G s S Gρ ρ ρ ρα αβ βα α
− −
= + − − ∈ −
 (7) 
On the other hand, in the absence of learning, the agent sees her decision as being 
whether to buy in the current period or never to buy. While we assume the learning-
constrained agent recognizes that the benefits from purchasing G in the current period 
can be enjoyed in the future period, we also assume that she does not realize that delaying 
her purchasing decision may allow her to avoid a “bad purchase” (i.e., a purchase that 
yields negative surplus). Thus, in the absence of learning, the agent’s WTP NLwtp  is the 
critical price NLp  such that the she is indifferent between purchasing the environmental 
improvement in the current period and never purchasing it. That is,  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )0, , (1 ) ,NLGE u m p G u m G u m Gβ β− + = + , (8) 
or 
 ( )
1
0
1(1 ) ( )NL NL Gwtp p m m E G G
ρρ ρ ραβ
α
− 
≡ = − − + −   , (9) 
where superscript NL stands for no-learning. 
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Zhao and Kling (2001, 2002) show that L NLwtp wtp≤ , and the inequality is strict if 
1Pr( ) 0PS > , or if the signal has a positive probability of being “useful.” Note that NLwtp  
is a static measure; no consideration of future options is incorporated into its formation. 
However, offered the opportunity for learning, the rational agent’s WTP falls to 
L NLwtp wtp≤ . In this context, the commitment cost can be thought of as the amount by 
which the price of the environmental improvement must be reduced in both periods to 
make the rational agent indifferent between purchasing now and delaying the decision 
until more information becomes available. In other words, commitment cost is the 
difference between NLwtp  and Lwtp . Thus, we can write CC as the following closed-
form expression: 
( ) ( )
1 1
0
1
1(1 ) ( ) .
1 Pr( )
NL L
G
P
ACC wtp wtp m m E G G
S
ρ ρρ ρ ρ ραββ α
 
− 
= − = − − − + −    
−     (10) 
Equation (10) contains an explicit representation of commitment cost, thus allowing 
us to understand the factors that affect its magnitude. In the next section, we discuss the 
design of an empirical test of whether dynamic behavior is present in the formation of 
WTP values.  
 
Design of the Empirical Test 
To test whether the effects of potential learning and uncertainty influence WTP as 
predicted by the commitment cost theory, we estimate respondent i’s stated WTP as 
 ,
NL
i i i iWTP wtp CC ε= − +  (11) 
where NLiwtp  is the non-learning agent’s WTP as defined in (9), iε  is a mean-zero error 
term, and CCi captures respondent i’s commitment cost. The value of CCi will be positive 
if WTP is formed dynamically and will be zero otherwise.  
While we use the exact theoretical representation for wtpNL derived from the CES 
model in (9) (see Mansfield 1999 for a similar approach, but without commitment costs), 
we employ the following simplified expression for CCi: 
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 ( )Delay Delay HiVar HiVari i iCC D Dγ γ= + , (12) 
where DelayiD  is a dummy variable equal to one if respondent i can potentially delay her 
decision, and HiVariD  is a dummy variable equal to one if respondent i faces a high degree 
of uncertainty regarding water quality after the proposed improvements. Although 
simple, this formulation takes into account the two key relationships identified in the 
theory above: commitment cost is present only when there is potential for future learning, 
and commitment cost varies according to the degree of uncertainty the respondent faces. 
Following Cameron (1988), iWTP  can be estimated from dichotomous choice data 
by noting that the probability that agent i votes yes (Yi = 1) on a referendum to improve 
environmental quality is 
 
( ) ( )
( )
Pr 1 Pr
Pr
1 Pr ,
i i i
NL
i i i i
NL
i i i
i
Y WTP T
wtp CC T
T wtp CC
τε
ε
τ
= = ≥
= − + ≥
 − +
= − ≤  
 (13) 
where Ti is the policy price faced by respondent i and τ  is the standard error of iε . 
Assuming iε  is drawn from the extreme-value error distribution yields, the logistic model 
and parameter estimates can be readily obtained from maximum likelihood estimation. 
An estimate of respondent i’s WTP,  iWTP , can be calculated as follows: 
 
 NL
ii iWTP wt p CC= − . (14) 
A survey instrument was designed to value various plans for improving water quality 
at Clear Lake in north-central Iowa. The survey first described the lake’s current condi-
tion in terms of water clarity, color, odor, fish catch, and the frequency of algae blooms 
and beach closings. Next, the survey described three future water quality scenarios 
corresponding to different degrees of environmental mitigation. Each of these scenarios 
was followed by a contingent valuation method (CVM) question in a referendum format, 
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designed to elicit respondents’ WTP in order to achieve the conditions described. A copy 
of the survey instrument is available from the authors. 
Before the actual mailing of the survey, the instrument was presented to a focus 
group of local residents to test its clarity and realism. This was followed by a mailed 
pretest. In its final form, the survey instrument was sent to a random sample of house-
holds in the cities of Clear Lake and Ventura, Iowa, both of which are located on Clear 
Lake. Following the procedure in Dillman 1978, a follow-up postcard and survey instru-
ment were sent to those households that did not respond to the initial mailing. The 
eventual response rate among surveys successfully delivered was about 70 percent. 
Four versions of the survey instrument were sent out, each differing in terms of the po-
tential for future learning and the degree of uncertainty surrounding water quality after the 
proposed improvement while holding constant the mean value of the improvement. Survey 
version 1 presented respondents with a low degree of variance (e.g., water clarity between 
6 and 8 feet after improvements) and no potential for future learning. The color photo and 
diagram used to depict this low level of uncertainty can be found in Appendix A. The 
absence of future learning potential was written into the CVM question as follows: 
Further, suppose this survey represents the State’s only chance to 
gather information about what kind of value people put on Clear Lake. 
Please respond as if this will be your final opportunity to vote on the 
issue, and that if the following referendum fails to pass, there will be no 
future programs to improve water quality at Clear Lake. Would you 
vote “yes” on a referendum that would adopt the proposed program but 
cost you $p (payable in five $p/5 installments over a five year period)?  
Version 2 again presented respondents with low variance but allowed for potential future 
learning by offering respondents a second chance to vote on the referendum: 
Further, suppose that if the referendum passes, the improvements 
would proceed immediately. However, if the referendum fails, any 
plans to improve the lake would be delayed for five years while further 
research takes place into the causes of lake pollution as well as 
alternative clean-up approaches. After this delay, any new information 
from studying the lake will be made available and you will then get a 
final chance to vote on the same referendum. Would you vote “yes” on 
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a referendum that would adopt the proposed program but cost you $p 
(payable in five $p/5 installments over a five year period)?  
Versions 3 and 4 were analogous to 1 and 2 except that respondents faced a higher degree 
of uncertainty in terms of the expected water quality (e.g., water clarity between 2 and 12 
feet after the proposed improvements).4 The color diagram used to depict this higher level 
of uncertainty appears in Appendix Β.  
Using these data, we test for the presence of a dynamic element in the formation of 
the WTP values by testing whether CC in (11) is significantly different from zero. We 
further test two comparative static predictions of the theory: first, that CC is only positive 
in the presence of delay and learning (i.e., 0Delayγ > ), and second, that CC increases 
when the consumer is more uncertain (faces higher variance) about the level of G after 
the proposed improvement (i.e., 0HiVarγ > ).  
 
Empirical Findings 
A total of 274 respondents provided completed surveys. Of these, thirty-three re-
spondents answered a follow-up question in such a way as to indicate that they did 
not understand the CVM question or considered it unrealistic. These respondents may 
not have given serious consideration to the policy price, in which case their responses 
to the CVM question would contain little or no information regarding their valuation 
of the resource. Therefore, we treat such answers as protest responses and exclude 
them from the following analysis. While we view these as the cleanest estimates, 
results including the protest responses are qualitatively unchanged from those 
presented here. A summary of the respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics can be 
found in Table 1.  
Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression described in the preceding sec-
tion. To form the wtpNL equation for estimation, the discount factor β was set to 0.758.5 
Qualitative results were unaffected by the choice of β. To form the expression 
( )0( )GE G Gρ ρ− , a uniform distribution over the range of water clarity values reported in 
the respondent’s survey instrument was computed as described earlier. 
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TABLE 1. Characteristics of survey respondents (n = 274) 
Variable Definition Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
County 
Average 
Income Total household income 56,000 44,000 51,000 
Education 1 if college graduate 0.36 0.48 0.16 
Age The respondent’s age 55 15 47 
Gender 1 if male 0.65 0.48 0.47 
Family size Includes adults and children 2.6 1.3 2.3 
Homeowner 1 if own home 0.91 0.29 0.72 
Year-round resident 1 if year-round resident 0.95 0.22 — 
 
TABLE 2. Regression results 
 
Basic CES 
Preferences 
 
Heterogeneous CES 
Preferences 
τ 0.00129*** (3.51)a 0.00100** (2.42) 
α  0.985*** (4.23)  — 
Interceptα  —  1.03*** (149) 
Incomeα  —  -0.00124*** (-3.95) 
ρ  0.277 (1.03)  — 
Interceptρ  —  0.610*** (2.59) 
Incomeρ  —  -0.0281*** (-3.76) 
Delayγ  0.918** (2.48)  0.831** (2.14) 
HiVarγ  -0.550 (-1.29)  -0.440 (-0.997) 
Percent correct 64%  66% 
Note: ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
aAsymptotic t ratios are in parentheses. 
 
The results in the second column correspond to the basic CES model.6 To investigate 
the robustness of the results, we also estimate a random parameters specification that 
allows α and ρ to vary with income, ignoring the interval restriction in the case of α. 
More specifically, iα  is estimated as Intercept Income imα α+  and iρ  is estimated as 
exp( ) 1Intercept Income imρ ρ− + + .7  
As seen in Table 2, the estimate of τ  is positive and highly significant in both mod-
els, indicating the demand curve for improved environmental quality is downward 
sloping (cf. (13)). The estimate for α  reported in the second column is very close to one 
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as expected, indicating that agents put a small weight overall on water quality. In the case 
where α  varies across individuals, the coefficient Incomeα  is negative and highly signifi-
cant, indicating that respondents put more weight on environmental quality as their 
income increases. The average value for α  is 0.959 with a 95 percent confidence interval 
of (0.929, 0.985) which we calculated using a bootstrapping technique. Specifically, 
1,000 realizations of Interceptα  and Incomeα  were drawn from a multivariate normal distribu-
tion with a variance-covariance matrix and mean vector taken from the maximum 
likelihood estimation whose results are presented in Table 2. For each of these draws, we 
calculated a sample average forαˆ . The reported confidence interval is generated by 
ranking these 1,000 αˆ  estimates and deleting the highest and lowest twenty-five. 
The estimate of ρ  reported in the second column of Table 2 is significantly different 
from one, indicating that while there is some degree of substitutability between money 
and environmental quality, the two are certainly not perfect substitutes.8 The average 
estimated value for ρ  from the second model is 0.410 with an associated 95 percent 
confidence interval of (0.149, 0.595) which follows from the Interceptρ  and Incomeρ  esti-
mates reported in the third column. As described for α , this confidence interval was 
calculated by bootstrapping. The estimate for Incomeρ  is negative and highly significant, 
resulting in the conclusion that respondents with higher income are more willing to 
substitute money for environmental quality.  
We turn now to testing for the presence of dynamic components in the formation of 
WTP, which depends critically on the sign and significance of the γ parameters. The 
estimate of Delayγ  is positive and highly significant in both specifications. Thus, offering 
respondents the opportunity to delay their decision until more information becomes 
available increases commitment costs. However, estimates of HiVarγ  are not significantly 
different from zero in either of the regressions. For both regressions, a chi-squared test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the γ  coefficients jointly equal zero at the 0.05 level in 
the basic case and at the 0.07 level in the heterogeneous case (χ2 = 6.77 [2] and χ2 =  5.31 
[2], respectively). Using the same bootstrapping technique discussed earlier to generate 
1,000 estimates of mean iCC , 99 percent of the realizations were greater than zero in the 
12 / Corrigan, Kling, and Zhao 
basic case, as were 97 percent in the heterogeneous case. These results indicate that there 
is a statistically significant, dynamic component to WTP.  
Further, the comparative static prediction that introducing delay and the subsequent 
potential learning yields positive commitment costs is also confirmed in the data. 
However, the lack of significance of the HiVarγ  parameter does not provide strong 
support for the comparative static prediction related to the variance of the uncertainty. 
This may seem surprising given that uncertainty is a necessary condition for the exis-
tence of commitment cost. One explanation may be that the uncertainty concerning the 
expected degree of water quality improvements is only one source of the uncertainty 
respondents face. Specifically, the water quality variable does not measure the uncer-
tainty in value respondents might eventually derive from the improvements. Therefore, 
finding that HiVarγ  is not significantly different from zero may indicate that the latter 
type of uncertainty is driving the presence of commitment costs. Another possible 
explanation is that, as mentioned in endnote 5, the mean water quality characteristics 
are not precisely identical across the two uncertainty levels (recall that while the two 
primary measures were varied by mean-preserving spreads, two others could not be and 
still be consistent with the underlying limnology). Thus, respondents may have re-
sponded to both changes in uncertainties and mean water quality levels. 
Table 3 shows estimates of mean WTP conditional on both the opportunity for learn-
ing and the level of uncertainty. Again, for the sake of comparison, we include the results 
of both regressions. 
These results indicate that reported WTP for environmental quality changes can have 
a large option value component. As a percentage of the no-learning WTP, the commit-
ment costs range from 25 to 57 percent. If researchers are to properly interpret empirical 
welfare measures, it is critical that they recognize the existence of these options and 
understand their significance in welfare assessment. 
 
Policy Implications and Conclusions 
These results have important implications for the design of stated preference surveys 
in applied welfare studies. Some policy analysis requires an estimate of the welfare 
effects of certain policy decisions, for example, the welfare effects of improving water 
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quality in a lake now. If uncertainty, irreversibility, and the potential for future learning 
are inherent to the policy under consideration, then commitment cost is relevant to the 
eventual policy decision, and lWTP  should be estimated. Further, the survey instrument 
should accurately convey the potential for delaying the decision, as well as describing 
what kind of information will be available in the future. Additionally, ex post analysis 
based on observed behavior (such as travel cost or hedonics) will be unable to capture 
this policy-relevant commitment cost. 
However, if the policy-relevant level of uncertainty and/or options for delay differ 
from those perceived by survey respondents (either because respondents do not believe 
the information presented in the survey or because they use other sources of information 
to form their beliefs about delay options and future learning), researchers may need to be 
careful in using lWTP  values directly in benefit-cost assessment, as the values may 
include discounts for commitment costs that are not appropriate for inclusion in benefit-
cost analysis.  
Suppose, for example, policymakers are considering converting an empty commercial 
lot into a public park. Assuming that money spent on the project cannot be recouped, that 
there is some degree of uncertainty regarding the benefit local residents will derive from 
the park if it is built, and that the project can reasonably be delayed until some future date 
when residents may have a better estimate of the park’s value, then commitment cost is 
policy relevant; that is, the appropriate value for use in a benefit assessment regarding a 
decision on the project today would include a discount for the lost delay opportunities. To 
avoid overestimating WTP, a survey instrument intended to estimate the value of the 
proposed project must be written so that it captures commitment cost. In particular, the 
instrument should note explicitly the potential for delay and subsequent learning.  
Further, respondents may demand options that reflect their own level of uncertainty 
about the good at the time of the survey, rather than the best scientific information 
available. In the extreme, there may be cases where the results of an action are very 
certain to the scientific community, but the issue described in a survey may be new to 
respondents and therefore the information provided may be assumed to be uncertain. In 
this case, respondents might demand compensation for losing the option to better inform 
themselves about the good, even though no real uncertainty about the project exists.  
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On the other hand, suppose the issue under consideration is whether to save a pristine 
wilderness area from imminent and irreversible commercial development. In this case, 
there is no potential for delaying the decision and, thus, no potential for future learning. 
Here, commitment cost is not policy relevant. Instead, the appropriate measure of welfare 
change is simply the expected equivalent variation. A study that does not convey the 
immediacy of the decision may mistakenly capture commitment cost as part of its esti-
mate of WTP, thus biasing the estimate downward. If respondents mistakenly believe that 
there are delay options and future learning opportunities, the WTP values estimated from 
a stated preference exercise will inaccurately reflect the value of the resource. 
Many applied welfare analyses require the estimate of the value of an environmental 
service or improvement, regardless of the decision framework. For example, a decision-
maker may be simply interested in knowing the welfare effects of having a better water 
quality in a local lake, without plans to take any action now or in the future. In this case, 
the relevant value should be without the commitment costs, or NLWTP . However, survey 
questions in CVM studies are framed mostly as hypothetical decisions, and commitment 
costs may arise if the respondents think that there is future learning. Then it is important 
that the survey be designed to remove or minimize the commitment costs by, for exam-
ple, reminding the respondents that they take the action as the only and last decision. 
In this paper, we test for the effects of potential future learning on WTP in the pres-
ence of uncertainty and irreversibility and for whether those effects are consistent with 
the presence of commitment costs. Using a survey instrument designed specifically for 
measuring WTP given varying degrees of uncertainty and learning potential, we collected 
data from Clear Lake–area residents regarding their valuation of a proposed project to 
improve water quality in Clear Lake. Our findings show that respondents’ WTP is indeed 
sensitive to the potential for future learning. This is consistent with the dynamic forma-
tion of WTP values and suggests that welfare analysts must take care to accurately 
represent the potential for future learning.
  
Endnotes 
1. WTP is equivalent to compensating variation for a price decrease or quality increase, 
and to equivalent variation for the opposite cases. 
2. For counter results, see Boyle, Reiling, and Phillips 1990, and Loomis, Gonzalez-
Caban, and Gregory 1994. 
3. The model can also be extended to the case where the agent is uncertain regarding 
utility she would receive from the improvement.  
4. Because of limnological realities, when we conduct mean-preserving spreads on the 
two key water quality variables, water clarity and algae blooms, the implied changes 
on the remaining variables are not mean-preserving. That is, strictly speaking, we are 
not able to control the uncertainties independent of the mean water quality levels. 
5. Unfortunately, since α  and β always appear together in the expression for wtpNL, the 
two parameters cannot be estimated separately in the basic CES preferences case. The 
parameter estimates reported in Table 2 were calculated by setting β = 0.758. This 
corresponds to a riskless rate of return of 5.70 percent, which is equal to the return on 
a five-year Treasury note issued November 1, 2000. In the basic CES case, the only 
estimate affected by the choice of β isα . The sensitivity of the results to this assump-
tion was tested using values for β between zero and one. The results from this 
analysis can be found in Appendix C.  
6.  In order to confine α  to the unit interval as indicated by the theory, we set 
/(1 )x xe eα = +  and estimate x. Likewise, to restrict ρ  to the ( ,1]−∞  interval, we set 
1yeρ = − +  and estimate y.  
7. A third model was estimated allowing α , ρ , Delayγ  and HiVarγ  to vary with income. 
The results are not reported here since the restriction 0Delay HiVarIncome Incomeγ γ= =  could not be 
rejected at conventional significance levels ( 2χ = 0.86 [2]). 
8. One of the appealing features of the CES form is that it allows explicit estimation of 
this degree of substitution, which Randall and Stoll (1980) and Hanemann (1991) 
have shown to be key to the formation of WTP values for quality changes.
  
 
 
 
Appendix A: Low-Variance Graphic 
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Appendix B: High-Variance Graphic 
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Appendix C: The Relationship between β  and α  
β  Value Estimate of α  Homogeneous Parameters 
Estimate of α  
Heterogeneous Parameters 
1.0 0.987 0.963 
0.9 0.986 0.961 
0.8 0.985 0.960 
0.7 0.984 0.958 
0.6 0.983 0.956 
0.5 0.982 0.953 
0.4 0.981 0.950 
0.3 0.980 0.951 
0.2 0.978 0.948 
0.1 0.976 0.945 
0.0 0.974 0.937 
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